1. HAZMAT SECURITY RISKS AND TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS
This synthesis document provides an overview of the Field Operational Test (FOT) and the processes, analytical frameworks and
methods used to evaluate the Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) Safety and Security
Technology FOT. Also described are the approaches to assessing the operational
efficiency and security benefits and costs, and findings and conclusions regarding
potential benefits, costs, market potential, and deployment issues associated
with the test technologies. Detailed information on the evaluation is contained
within the reference Volume III: Evaluation Final Report Detail, Sections
1.1 PROJECT CONTEXT
The HAZMAT movement chain presents an attractive target
for terrorists due to multiple points of vulnerability that exist at manufacturing
facilities, shippers, motor carriers, and shipment receivers. Hazardous materials
are an especially sought after target since the nature of the cargo serves
as a dangerous and ready-made weapon. Several hundred thousand HAZMAT shipments
originate, travel en route, and are received every day, so the exposure to
these vulnerabilities is very broad. Manufacturers and shippers may become
terrorist targets due to potential HAZMAT production or storage at their facilities.
Motor carriers control the HAZMAT shipment en route
between shipper and receiver. Since they transport 95 percent of hazardous
materials, motor carriers are potentially targets for direct attack or hijacking
for use as a weapon during en-route HAZMAT movements.
The immediate damage from a terrorist attack could be
severe in terms of both human and economic losses. Human losses could include
both injuries and death, with up to 10,000 casualties predicted under the
most severe scenario considered in this study.
Economic losses could also be substantial. These losses would accrue most immediately
to the affected shipper, motor carrier, receiver, and surrounding community.
However, significant and perhaps even greater secondary economic impacts also
may occur. These impacts may include disruption of the transportation industry;
continuing business restrictions on HAZMAT manufacturers; potential damage
to financial markets; and demoralization of the general public.
Myriad technology products are commercially available
that are designed to enhance HAZMAT and transport security by making HAZMAT
cargo more secure, less desirable to terrorists, and by reducing the consequences
of intentional and non-intentional releases. Many of these technologies were
tested and evaluated during the course of this HAZMAT FOT.
1.2 RESPONSE TO INCREASED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS
The catastrophic events of September 11, 2001 and the
ongoing war on terrorism have heightened the level of concern from Federal
government officials and the transportation industry regarding the secure
transport of hazardous materials. Security concerns focus on the potential
of HAZMAT shipments as targets for terrorists. HAZMAT shipments through intermodal
connectors, modes, and facilities are all attractive targets for terrorists,
and pose a much greater concern to public safety than most other shipment
types. HAZMAT shipments, especially fuels and chemicals, are especially attractive
targets due to the multiple points of vulnerability. These vulnerabilities
exist at shipper, motor carrier, and shipment recipient facilities, and during
shipment movement en route throughout the nation's roadway infrastructure.
Numerous international and domestic incidents occurred
over the past several years that demonstrate the real threat potential that
HAZMAT shipments pose. For example, the following events all occurred in a
2-month period in 2002:
March 31, 2002: A 29-year-old driver for a propane distributor drove away
with a 3,000-gallon bobtail. He made a telephone threat stating that he wanted
to kill President George W. Bush and that he would use the bobtail as a "3,000-lb bomb".
April 11, 2002: A terrorist driving a truck carrying liquefied natural gas
ignited his cargo in front of a synagogue on the Tunisian Island of Djerba,
killing 17 people, mainly German and French tourists. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility
for the blast.
May 16, 2002: A tractor-trailer carrying 10 tons of deadly cyanide in 96 drums
was stolen after three armed men held up the vehicle north of Mexico City.
Six drums were never found.
May 2002: A fully loaded tanker truck pulled into Israel's largest fuel depot
and suddenly caught fire due to an explosive charge connected to a cellular
phone. The fire was extinguished, but had the truck exploded, destruction
and death would have resulted.
Events such as these demonstrate the security and safety
risks associated with HAZMAT shipments. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA), working in close cooperation with the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), has attempted to proactively address public and private sector HAZMAT
security concerns by identifying potential security risks related to HAZMAT
transportation and proposing solutions to minimize those risks. FMCSA embarked
on a program to improve HAZMAT security and safety by using regulatory measures,
security assessments, and outreach efforts.
Part of this effort was to sponsor an industry competitive
procurement. This led to FMCSA awarding a contract for a team led by the Battelle
Memorial Institute (Battelle) (Deployment Team) to test currently existing
major technologies that could offer solutions to minimize security risks of
truck-based HAZMAT shipments. Supporting Deployment Team members included:
QUALCOMM; the American Transportation Research Institute (ATRI); the Commercial
Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA); SAVI Technologies; the Biometrics Solutions
Group (BSG); and the Spill Center.
To evaluate the technologies tested in this FOT, their
costs, benefits, and the operational processes require to be performed, the
FMCSA, supported by the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)-Joint Program
Office (JPO), awarded an Independent Evaluation contract in August 2002. Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC) (Evaluation Team) led the Independent
Evaluation for this HAZMAT FOT. The Evaluation Team also performed a key role
in performing independent data collection and analysis activities for this
1.3 PROJECT RATIONALE
The FMCSA is actively investigating methods to improve HAZMAT security. In parallel,
the private sector has developed, or is currently developing a number of technological
solutions that may offer security benefits. While several of these potential
technological solutions have demonstrated efficiency benefits and some limited
security benefits, most are not yet in widespread usage within the HAZMAT
transportation industry. As such, the need existed for a national field operational
test comprising complete suites of technology to address typical, specific
HAZMAT operational scenarios.
The FMCSA sponsored this national FOT to demonstrate
the effectiveness of technological system solutions to enhance safety and
security. The FOT and accompanying evaluation may lead to the development
of policies and incentives to promote deployment of the most promising technologies
throughout the HAZMAT industry.
The purpose of this evaluation is to quantify all the relative costs of the
deployed components and systems, and independently assess related security
and efficiency benefits. While the functionality for various technologies
was considered and tested during this FOT, it was not the Evaluation Team's
intent to endorse any vendors for products tested during the evaluation process.
SAIC led the Evaluation Team effort with
assistance from Cambridge Systematics, Inc. (CSI). The Evaluation Team coordinated
activities with the Deployment Team to obtain quantitative and qualitative
test-generated data and information. This data and information was used to
independently develop the benefit-cost assessments for security and operational
efficiency impacts on the HAZMAT delivery chain.
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