HM SHIPPER CHECK 2000

MARCH 20- 24, 2000
| Table of Contents | |
|---|---|
| Shipper Check 2000 Report | 1 |
| ONEDOT | 2 |
| International | 3 |
| Highlights | 3 |
| Findings | 4 |
| Conclusions | 7 |
| Appendix A 8 Inspection Results by Citation |
8 |
HM SHIPPER CHECK 2000
The Federal Motor Carriers Safety
Administration (FMCSA) placed additional emphasis on the safety of
shippers (offerors) of hazardous materials for transportation by highway during
the week of March 20-24,
2000. This special emphasis project was designated “HM SHIPPER CHECK 2000.”
The goal of this
project was to reduce the risk of HM incidents (spills) by targeting HM shippers
are responsible of
complying with the Hazardous Materials Regulations. A secondary goal of the
project focused on
additional field testing of the HM Packaging Inspection Program (HMPIP) software
for HM shipper data
collection. The data collected will help in us in achieving the following goals:
1) improve the shipper
prioritization list; 2) determine other ways of identifying high risk shippers;
and 3) target high risk shippers
in order to conduct Shipper Compliance Reviews.
Shipper Check 2000 consisted of packaging
inspections conducted at dockside, less-than truckload
facilities, and roadside. Shipper Check 2000 provided an opportunity for FMCSA
personnel to work with
our “ONE DOT” and State partners. A number of Division Offices elected
to conduct shipper compliance
reviews in addition to, or in lieu of the packaging inspections.
![]() |
| Nevada
Division Office and the Nevada Highway Patrol conduct HM inspections. From left to right: Unidentified CF Driver, SI Paula Reynolds NHP Trooper Steve Griswold, SI Mike Schlarmann,, and NHP Trooper John Sherven |
For HM Shipper Check 2000, it was
decided to
rely on the data export feature of the HMPIP software to generate reports. This
feature reduces the reporting activities for the Division Offices and eliminate
the need for Division Office/Service Center coordinators. The reports generated
from the HMPIP data are contained in Tables 1-3 and Appendix A. A total of
101 state and federal personnel representing five different agencies completed
HMPIP inspection forms.
The participants made Shipper
Check 2000 a very
successful operation resulting in 1722 inspections with 594 violations found.
The results indicate that 1 of every three packages checked was in violation
of the Federal Hazardous Materials Regulations (FHMR). A 34% violation rate
indicates a significant compliance problem on the part of HM shippers.
In addition to the HMPIP inspections, Division Offices performed approximately
118 Compliance Reviews on HM Shippers or Shipper Terminals in this one week
compared to the 125 HM shipper CRs conducted during the entire fiscal year 1999.
Shipper Check 2000 compliance reviews produced fourteen potential
enforcement cases (12%) compared to a 5-6% enforcement rate in 1998 and 1999.
Investigation Highlights
Safety Investigator William
Moravec of the South Dakota Division Office discovered a shipment
of Powder, Smokeless, 1.3C (explosives with fire, blast, and/or projection hazard)
which was classified
as a Flammable Solid, 4.1. This poses a significant hazard, especially for emergency
responders since the
emergency response procedures listed in the Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG
2000) are
significantly different for flammable solids and explosives. ERG Guide 133 for
Flammable Solids instructs
to fight a fire while ERG Guide 112 for 1.3 Explosives instructs to evacuate
the public for a mile and let the
cargo burn. As a result of this discovery, a Shipper compliance review was conducted
resulting in a Notice
of Claim for $9,800.

Safety Investigator Arthur Fleener of the Iowa Division Office discovered a
violation that involves over
a million packages. Delphi Automotive Systems manufactures automotive batteries
and sells them under
the brand name of AC DELCO. When shipped from the manufacturer to General Motors
the batteries
are shipped under the exception found in 49 CFR §173.159. Delphi places
Corrosive labels on the
packages, since the batteries are re-sold by General Motors and are frequently
shipped with other
hazardous materials. This subsequent shipment does not qualify for the exception
in §173.159 and
therefore these shipments of batteries must be in full compliance with the regulations
including labeling.
Unfortunately the labels applied by Delphi are less than half of the required
size and could be misunderstood
or mis-read in an emergency situation. Delphi has notified their customers of
the requirement to place the
proper labels on the shipment of their batteries. Delphi has also agreed to
properly label batteries
manufactured after 11/01/2000.
“ONE DOT”
The Hawaii Division hosted
shipper week with five agencies participating. They included RSPA, FAA-Security-Dangerous
Goods, USCG-Marine Safety Office, Hawaii DOT Motor Vehicle Safety Office and
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. Each agency had an opportunity
to work with other agency participants to receive awareness training of their
activities and procedures for conducting hazardous material inspections.
The activities included: one day of roadside inspections at the weigh station
located adjacent to Sealand and Matson, one day at the pier of Young Brothers
Ltd, and one day at the cargo facilities at the Honolulu< International Airport.
At these various locations package inspections were conducted using the HMPIP
software in conjunction with the appropriate agency’s routine inspection
activities. As a result of the three days of activity, over 15 HMPIP inspection
worksheets, 11 roadside level 3 inspections, and one enforcement case were conducted.
The Missouri Division participated
in a hazardous material strike force conducted in St. Louis, Mo involving the
FAA, RSPA and the FMCSA. There were approximately 35 individuals involved in
this activity. An initial meeting was held on the first day of the activity
to introduce everyone and make assignments. During the first evening of the
shipper week FMCSA’s Tim Knoll accompanied several FAA and RSPA individuals
on a trip to the St. Louis airport to the Federal Express terminal conducting
package inspections. This resulted in the discovery of some HM packages being
in violation of 177.848 compatibility requirements. Follow-up to these facilities
were made resulting in compliance reviews of shippers and freight forwarders.
The week resulted in a total of 64 inspections with 26 enforcement actions.
FAA Western Pacific Region Gerald Moore, Hazardous Materials Program
Coordinator, FAA Western Pacific Region reported that FAA investigators performed
shipper inspections in support of Shipper Check.
In addition to Honolulu, shipper checks were performed in Los Angeles, Phoenix,
and San Francisco.
“International”
The Vermont Division arranged
and participated in a joint interagency, international detail with the
Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles (our MCSAP agency), U.S. Customs, the Vermont
National
Guard, and Transport Canada. This team worked a day at the U.S.- Canada border
crossing in Highgate
Springs, VT, concentrating on HM shipments entering the U.S. from Canada. Once
again, the actual
number of loads seen was small, especially since the word quickly spread over
the CB that all HM loads
were being examined so the flow of vehicles slowed dramatically a couple of
hours into the detail.
However, some violations were discovered involving Canadian shippers which were
referred directly to
Transport Canada, which will contact the shippers to get the violations corrected.
It was also an excellent
opportunity to learn about practical application of the TDG rules and for Transport
Canada Inspector
Nathalie Boucher to learn about the U.S. rules from the perspectives of the
4 different U.S. agencies
involved. One result was an agreement to establish a program in which Transport
Canada will periodically
send inspectors to work with U.S. Customs and Vermont MCSAP inspectors at the
border to become
familiar with how Canadian shippers are preparing HM loads for transport into
the U.S.
Findings
The Table 1 below contains
a listing of the number of violations discovered per Class/Division of hazardous
materials. Of the 594 total violations discovered 208 (35%) involved Class 3
(Flammable/Combustible),
190 (32%) involved Class 8 (Corrosives) and 111 (19%) involved Class 2 (Gases.)
| HM Class/Division | Total |
|---|---|
| Explosive | 4 |
| 1.1 Explosive (Class A Explosive) | 3
|
| 1.3 Explosive (Class B Explosive) | 4 |
| 1.4 Explosive (Class C Explosive) | 9 |
| 2.1 Flammable Gas | 20 |
| 2.1 Liquified Petroleum Gas | 68 |
| 2.2 Nonflammable Gas | 15 |
| 2.3 Poison Gas (Zone A) | 4 |
| 2.3 Poison Gas (Zone B) | 1 |
| 2.3 Poison Gas (Zone C) | 2.3 Poison Gas (Zone C)|
| 3 Combustible Liquid | 40 |
| 3 Flammable Liquid | 168 |
| 4.1 Flammable Solid | 4 |
| 4.2 Spontaneously Combustible | 1 |
| 4.3 Dangerous when wet | 3 |
| 5.1 Oxidizer | 21 |
| 5.2 Organic Peroxide | 3 |
| 6.1 (Poison Liquid) | 15 |
| 6.1 (Poison Solids) | 2 |
| 7 Radioactive Material | 2 |
| 8 Corrosive Material | 189 |
| 8 Zone A | 1 |
| 9 (Hazardous Substance) | 2 |
| 9 (Hazardous Waste) | 5 |
| 9 Miscellaneous HM | 4 |
| ORM-D(Consumer Commodity) | 4 |
| Total | 594 |
The following table contains
a list of the top twenty citations discovered. The top twenty accounted for
441
(74%) out of the total violations discovered. Ten of the top twenty citations
concerned shipping paper
violations. Eight of the top twenty-five were either acute or critical violations.
The acute/critical violations
accounted for 196 violations (32% ) of the total violations discovered. Appendix
A contains a complete
listing of violations cited.
TOP 20 CITATIONS
| CITATION | VIOLATION | ACUTE/ CRITICAL |
FREQ. |
|---|---|---|---|
172.201(a)(1) |
Failing
to enter HM description on shipping paper in the manner required |
67 |
|
172.202(a)
|
Failing
to enter proper description of HM |
CRITICAL
|
67 |
172.301(a)
|
Failing
to mark non-bulk pkg. Of HM with shipping name and ID # |
CRITICAL
|
38 |
172.204(a)
|
Failing
to make or sign a certification on a HM shipping paper |
31 |
|
172.400(a)
|
Failing
to properly label HM container or package |
CRITICAL |
25 |
173.22(a)
|
Failing
to properly classify and describe HM offered for transportation |
ACUTE |
25 |
172.202(a)(4)
|
Failing
to enter proper packing group on HM shipping paper |
22 |
|
172.202(b)
|
Failing
to enter basic description of HM in proper sequence |
17 |
|
173.34(c)
|
Offering
a cylinder with markings not maintained |
CRITICAL |
15 |
177.834(a)
|
Failing
to secure HM containers against movement in transit |
15 |
|
173.34(e)
|
Offering
a cylinder not retested/marked as required |
13 |
|
171.2(a)
|
Offering
or accepting HM for transport not properly prepared |
12 |
|
172.200(a)
|
Offering
a HM without preparing a shipping paper (none) |
ACUTE
|
11 |
172.200
|
Offering
a HM without preparing a shipping paper (incomplete) |
8 |
|
173.25(a)(2)
|
Failing
to mark over-pack with ship name, etc. when required |
8 |
|
177.817(a)
|
Transporting
HM without a proper shipping paper |
CRITICAL |
8 |
172.203(k)
|
Failing
to enter a technical name in association with description |
7 |
|
172.304(a)
|
Failing
to properly mark HM pkg. Per requirements |
7 |
|
172.602(a)
|
Failing
to have all required emergency response info |
7 |
|
172.604(a)(3)
|
No
emergency response phone # on shipping paper as required |
CRITICAL
|
7 |
177.816(a)
|
Failing
to provide HM training to driver |
7 |
Table 3 below contains a
list of package types identified in the shipments found in violation. The
packages listed below may not have been in violation. Of the 467 packages identified;
93 were
fiberboard boxes, 64 were plastic drums, 52 were cylinders, 48 were cargo tanks,
and 26 were
Intermediate Bulk Containers (IBC).
| 11A IBC | 0 |
| 1A2 STEEL DRUM | 17 |
| 1B1 Aluminum drum | 0 |
| 1G FIBER DRUM | 0 |
| 1G FIBERBOARD DRUM | 10 |
| 1H1 PLASTIC DRUM | 53 |
| 1H2 PLASTIC DRUM | 11 |
| 1N1 METAL DRUM | 1 |
| 1N2 METAL DRUM | 0 |
| 2P LINER | 0 |
| 2O LINER | 2 |
| 31A IBC | 26 |
| 31H IBC |
4 |
| 3AL CYLINDERS |
0 |
| 3AX CYLINDERS |
0 |
| 3H1 JERRICAN |
4 |
| 3H2 JERRICAN |
0 |
| 3HT CYLINDER | 1 |
| 4A STEEL BOX | 3 |
| 4AA480 CYLINDER | 0 |
| 4B CYLINDER | 0 |
| 4BA CYLINDER | 51 |
| 4BW CYLINDER | 0 |
| 4G FIBERBOARD BOX | 93 |
| 4HI PLASTIC BOX | 1 |
| 4H2 PLASTIC BOX | 0 |
| 4L CYLINDER | 2 |
| 51 PORTABLE TANK | 0 |
| 5H4 PLASTIC BAG | 0 |
| 6HA1 COMPOSITE PKG | 2 |
| 6M | 0 |
| 7A TYPE A | 1 |
| 8 CYLINDER | 0 |
| CYLINDER | 0 |
| CYLINDERS | 0 |
| II | 0 |
| IM 101 PORTABLE TANKS | 0 |
| IM 102 PORTABLE TANKS | 0 |
| MC 306 | 23 |
| MC 307 | 2 |
| MC 312 | 1 |
| MC 331 | 8 |
| DOT 406 | 13 |
| DOT 407 | 1 |
| METAL PAILS | 0 |
| MISC COMPOSITE PKG | 0 |
| MISC DOT SPEC PKG | 30 |
| MISC POP PKG | 2 |
| NON SPEC PKG | 79 |
| OTHER | 24 |
| PG II | 0 |
| PG III | 1 |
| PLASTIC | 0 |
| PLASTIC BOTTLES | 0 |
| UNKNOWN | 0 |
Conclusions
Shipper Check 2000 focused additional
attention on HM shippers with the intention of reducing
hazardous materials incidents. There are no direct measures which quantify incident
reduction due to
this activity. However, the violation data generated by inspections using the
HMPIP software indicate
that there is a significant non-compliance problem with HM shippers. Identification
of HM violations
and removal of non-compliant shipments from transportation improves safety.
FMCSA will continue to develop and refine the HMPIP software and expand the
use of this program.
The data collected from these activities will eventually be used in a performance/risk
based algorithm to
identify problem shippers. FMCSA will increase its compliance and enforcement
activities with the
goal of increasing the compliance posture of HM shippers and reducing the likelihood
of hazardous
materials incidents.
Shipper Check 2000 Results by Citation
| 107.608(b) | 6 |
| 107.620(b) | 6 |
| 171 | 1 |
| 171.2 | 1 |
| 171.2(a) | 12 |
| 171.2(a)/173.22(a) | 1 |
| 171.2(f) | 2 |
| 171.2(f)(2) | 6 |
| 172 | 1 |
| 172.200 | 8 |
| 172.200(a) | 11 |
| 172.201(a)(1) | 67 |
| 172.201(a)(2) | 2 |
| 172.201(a)(3) | 3 |
| 172.201(a)(4) | 1 |
| 172.202(a) | 67 |
| 172.202(a)(4) | 22 |
| 172.202(a)(5) | 2 |
| 172.202(b) | 17 |
| 172.202(b)/172.203(b) | 2 |
| 172.202(b)/172.203(c)(2) | 1 |
| 172.202(e) | 1 |
| 172.203 | 1 |
| 172.203(a) | 1 |
| 172.203(b) | 6 |
| 172.203(c)(2) | 6 |
| 172.203(k) | 7 |
| 172.203(k)(1) | 1 |
| 172.203(m) | 1 |
| 172.204(a) | 31 |
| 172.204(d) | 1 |
| 172.301(a) | 38 |
| 172.301(a)(1) | 1 |
| 172.302(c) | 1 |
| 172.304(a) | 7 |
| 172.306(a) | 1 |
| 172.312(a)(1) | 2 |
| 172.312(a)(2) | 2 |
| 172.313(a) | 1 |
| 172.324(b) | 1 |
| 172.326(c) | 1 |
| 172.328(b) | 1 |
| 172.328(c) | 1 |
| 172.334(b) | 1 |
| 172.400(a) | 25 |
| 172.401(a)(1) | 1 |
| 172.402 | 2 |
| 172.402(b) | 1 |
| 172.406(a) | 1 |
| 172.406(a)(ii) | 4 |
| 172.406(f) | 5 |
| 172.407(a) | 1 |
| 172.416 | 1 |
| 172.502(a)(1) | 5 |
| 172.504(a) | 5 |
| 172.516(a) | 3 |
| 172.519 | 1 |
| 172.600(c)(1) | 1 |
| 172.602(a) | 7 |
| 172.602(c)(1) | 1 |
| 172.604(a) | 5 |
| 172.604(a)(1) | 2 |
| 172.604(a)(2) | 3 |
| 172.604(a)(3) | 7 |
| 172.704(a) | 6 |
| 172.704(a)(2) | 3 |
| 172.704(d) | 6 |
| 173.164(c)(4) | 1 |
| 173.203 | 1 |
| 173.22(a)(1) | 1 |
| 173.22(a)(2) | 25 |
| 173.22(a)(4) | 3 |
| 173.24(b)(1) | 3 |
| 173.24(b)(2) | 4 |
| 173.24(f) | 1 |
| 173.24b(d)(2) | 1 |
| 173.25(a)(2) | 8 |
| 173.25(a)(4) | 3 |
| 173.30 | 1 |
| 173.301(i) | 2 |
| 173.32(e) | 2 |
| 173.33(a) | 1 |
| 173.33(a)(3) | 1 |
| 173.34(a) | 4 |
| 173.34(c) | 15 |
| 173.34(e) | 13 |
| 177.801(a) | 3 |
| 177.816(a) | 7 |
| 177.817(a) | 8 |
| 177.832(a) | 1 |
| 177.834(a) | 15 |
| 177.834(g) | 1 |
| 177.848 | 2 |
| 178.3(a) | 1 |
| 178.3(a)(3) | 2 |
| 178.345(c)(1) | 1 |
| 180 | 2 |
| 180.352 | 1 |
| 180.407(c) | 1 |
| 180.407(f) | 1 |